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1. Introduction 
Electoral accountability is key for the democratic quali-
ty of European integration. Yet, although the powers of 
the European Parliament (EP) have strongly increased 
in recent decades (Rittberger, 2012), the corresponding 
election campaigns are conventionally seen as ‘second-
order’ contests, during which political competition is 
mainly driven by domestic issues (Reif & Schmitt, 
1980). Yet, recent integration literature raises doubts 
on whether a key assumption of this model—that vot-
ers ascribe little relevance to the EU—still holds. By 
contrast, observers from different camps note that the 
politicization of European issues is augmenting (De 
Wilde, 2011; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Hutter & Grande, 
2014; Rauh & Zürn, 2014; Statham & Trenz, 2013). 
These works show that the consecutive authority trans-
fers from member-states to the EU have made Europe-
an questions more salient and contested among the 
wider citizenry. Yet, has this societal politicization also 
been met by a greater supply of political debate about 
Europe, and has it affected the degree to which main-
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stream parties react to Eurosceptic challenger parties? 
We approach this question by comparing the 2009 
and 2014 EP election campaigns. In between these 
contests, the societal demand for political debate 
about Europe has arguably grown. European elites at-
tempted to increase the consequentiality of the 2014 
electoral contest with the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ initiative 
(Hobolt, 2014). More importantly, the 2014 elections 
took place against the backdrop of the Euro crisis, 
which created high and sustained public salience of Eu-
ropean issues over a period of almost five years. In ad-
dition, the increased electoral relevance of distinct an-
ti-European parties stands out: in the run up to the 
2014 EP elections Eurosceptics performed well in many 
national election polls.  
To assess whether and how this changing context 
has affected the supply of public partisan debate on 
Europe, we examine the media coverage of the elec-
tion campaigns in two EU founding states with signifi-
cant national Eurosceptic challenger parties—France 
and the Netherlands. In modern ‘audience democra-
cies’ (Manin, 1997) mass media constitute a crucial 
arena linking political elites and the wider electorate 
(e.g. de Vreese, 2001; Statham & Trenz, 2013). Parties 
try to set the electoral agenda in this arena by making 
their preferred issues visible to the broader citizenry 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck, Maier, & Kaid, 
2011; Weaver, McCombs, & Shaw, 2004). Hence, our 
research interest guides us to mediatized partisan mo-
bilization efforts on European issues. 
Using semi-automated procedures we retrieved co-
occurrences of party actors and keywords for European 
issues in a large corpus of articles published in six 
French and Dutch newspapers in the seven weeks pre-
ceding each EP election. Based on this data we, first, 
study the supply of European issues by Eurosceptic chal-
lengers and mainstream parties during and across both 
EP campaigns. Second, we assess temporal contagion ef-
fects of mediatized Eurosceptic mobilization on publical-
ly visible mainstream party emphasis of EU issues. 
The article is structured as follows. We first discuss 
the changing context of EP elections before deriving 
detailed expectations from the literature on partisan 
competition and mediatization. The subsequent sec-
tion details our empirical strategy. Then, after present-
ing our findings, we summarize the major implications 
in the concluding section. The analyses show that the 
degree of publically visible partisan mobilization efforts 
on European issues was on average not significantly 
higher during the 2014 EP campaign. Whereas particu-
larly incumbent parties made European issues visible in 
both periods, parties from the radical right stepped up 
their mobilization efforts during the 2014 campaigns in 
France and Netherlands. The Eurosceptic radical right 
exhibit significant contagion effects on mainstream 
party emphasis of European issues in the short-run, but 
the extent of this contagion was, surprisingly, lower in 
the 2014 campaign. The results suggest that the poten-
tially higher salience of EU issues among the electorate 
is not met by a growing and more interactive supply of 
corresponding partisan debate. 
2. EP Elections in Context: EU Politicization and 
Mediatization 
Since the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980) on 
the first direct EP election, these electoral contests 
have often been described as ‘second-order’ elections. 
The second-order model attributes the low voter turn-
out as well as the gains of smaller parties and the loss-
es of national incumbents during EP elections to a lack 
of interest on part of the electorate (Marsh & Mikhay-
lov, 2010, p. 13; Reif & Schmitt, 1980, p. 9). Since vot-
ers are assumed to ascribe little political relevance to 
the EU and the EP in particular, the model expects that 
voters use EP elections mainly to punish their domestic 
governments. Respective partisan campaigns should 
thus primarily invoke domestic conflicts rather than re-
volving around European issues (Van der Brug & Van 
der Eijk, 2007; Van der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996). 
Yet, the view that EP elections lack European con-
tent has received a couple of dents over the course of 
integration. There is evidence that individual vote 
choices during more recent EP elections are driven by 
individual preferences on European issues (Hobolt, 
Spoon, & Tilley, 2009; Rohrschneider & Clark, 2008). 
Moreover, EP elections in younger EU member states 
display a lower degree of protest votes against incum-
bent governments (Koepke & Ringe, 2006). And most 
importantly, parties with clear-cut, outspoken positions 
on European integration tend to fare better in more 
recent European elections (Hix & Marsh, 2007, p. 503; 
Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004). 
Such findings qualify the expectation that EP elec-
tion campaigns are not about Europe at all. Moreover, 
they are in accordance with recent works that attest to 
a growing EU politicization defined broadly as ‘an in-
crease in polarization of opinions, interests or values 
and the extent to which they are publicly advanced to-
wards policy formulation within the EU’ (De Wilde, 
2011). Such perspectives argue that the extension of 
supranational political authority over the consecutive 
EU treaty revisions have triggered sustained societal 
demands for more political debate on European issues 
(De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Rauh, 2015). Others claim that 
it is the increased relevance of national identity con-
flicts that raises the public contentiousness of Europe-
an questions (Kriesi et al., 2012). In any case, EU politi-
cization implies that European ‘decision making has 
shifted from an insulated elite to mass politics’ 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 13). Against this backdrop, 
recent EP elections provide a window of opportunity 
for political entrepreneurs willing to profit from mobi-
lizing on European questions (Treib, 2014). 
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To assess whether this context offers voters more 
debate on Europe, a focus on media coverage of EP 
election campaigns is crucial. Public media play a cen-
tral role in the way modern democracies function 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; McCombs & Shaw, 1972), 
since it is only in the public sphere that latent societal 
conflicts become manifest and alternative political 
choices are revealed (Koopmans & Statham, 2010, p. 
44; Meijers, 2013, p. 3). Particularly during election 
campaigns, the media constitute the central arena in 
which parties can offer political alternatives to voters 
(Strömbäck et al., 2011). Just as parties compete over 
which issues are on the political agenda (Carmines & 
Stimson, 1986; Schattschneider, 1960), they also engage 
in a struggle over the visibility of ‘their’ issues and posi-
tions in the public sphere (Koopmans, 2004, p. 373). 
With regard to European integration, Van Spanje 
and de Vreese (2014) argue that media evaluations of 
the European Union influenced vote choices in the 
2009 EP election (see also Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boom-
gaarden, & de Vreese, 2008). Similarly, Hobolt and col-
leagues find that a Eurosceptic tone in the media cov-
erage of an EP campaign spurs the level of voter 
defection from mainstream parties (Hobolt et al., 
2009). More generally, the extant literature demon-
strates that media visibility matters for the electoral 
fortunes of parties (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998; 
Hopmann, Vliegenthart, De Vreese, & Albæk, 2010)—
especially for challengers propagating new issues on 
the electoral map (e.g. Koopmans & Muis, 2009; 
Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, & Van Spanje, 2012; Wal-
grave & De Swert, 2004). In sum, mediatized partisan 
mobilization on European issues is in fact consequen-
tial for voters’ preferences. 
Unsurprisingly, most recent studies of EU-related 
partisan mobilization focus therefore on mediatized 
conflicts (Hutter & Grande, 2014; Kriesi et al., 2008, 
2012; Statham & Trenz, 2013). But not all purposive 
mobilization efforts of political parties—as for example 
expressed in speeches, manifestos or press releases—
will make it onto the media agenda (Hopmann, Van 
Aelst, & Legnante, 2012). Since the seminal work by 
Galtung and Ruge (1965) we know that journalists and 
editors act as gatekeepers. Competitive pressures and 
space constraints in media outlets lead to a selective 
coverage of political developments. Whether the me-
dia consider a particular event ‘newsworthy’ will de-
pend, among other things, on the expected relevance 
of the action for the medium’s primary audience, on 
the level of conflict associated with the event, on the 
possibilities for dramatization and personalization, as 
well as on the perceived standing of the involved ac-
tors (Galtung & Ruge, 1965, pp. 65-72). When assessing 
the supply side of publically visible partisan debate on 
Europe, such media logics have to be taken into ac-
count. Yet, media actors still can ultimately only select 
from the menu of mobilization efforts that political 
parties offer. Moreover, during election periods politi-
cal parties exert particular influence on the media 
agenda rather than the other way around (e.g. Bran-
denburg, 2002; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). 
3. Theorizing Mediatized Partisan Mobilization Efforts 
in Recent EP Campaigns 
The political developments between the 2009 and 
2014 EP campaigns have arguably amplified such politi-
cization and mediatization dynamics. First, between 
2009 and 2014 the Greek deficit turned into a full-
fledged European financial and monetary crisis. The 
numerous supranational emergency measures and 
their immense inroads into national budgetary auton-
omy have made supranational authority clearly tangi-
ble for the wider European publics—thereby spurring 
the societal politicization of European integration to an 
unprecedented degree (Rauh & Zürn, 2014). Second, 
European elites from the European Commission and 
particularly the European Parliament sought a more 
proactive approach in the run-up to the 2014 election. 
The ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ initiative, in which each of the 
EP’s major political groups selected a common lead 
candidate, aimed to increase the perceived consequen-
tiality of the elections (Hobolt, 2014). 
For political parties, this should have signalled a 
higher salience of European questions among the elec-
torate, which in turn creates incentives to emphasize Eu-
ropean issues for electoral reasons. For media gate-
keepers, it should have signalled a higher relevance of 
European issues among readers and more conflict po-
tential among political elites, which increases news val-
ue. Hence both from a partisan competition as well as 
from mediatization perspective it can be expected that: 
H1.1: The degree of publically visible partisan 
mobilization efforts on European issues in EP 
election campaigns is higher in 2014 than in 2009. 
This effect will hardly be uniform across all parties, 
however. From a party competition perspective, sali-
ency theory (Budge, 1982; Dolezal, Ennser-Jedenastik, 
Müller, & Winkler, 2014) underlines that parties do not 
only compete on particular positions but also on which 
issues to emphasize in the first place (Carmines & Stim-
son, 1986; Schattschneider, 1960). Here it is conven-
tionally assumed that mainstream parties downplay 
European issues, since they are faced with more di-
verse opinions among their constituencies and cannot 
map European issues easily on the domestically domi-
nating left-right dimension (de Vries, 2007; Statham & 
Trenz, 2013; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004). In contrast, 
smaller anti-European parties can afford to or even 
profit from firmly rejecting the integration project (de 
Vries & Edwards, 2009; Hobolt & de Vries, 2015; Van 
de Wardt, de Vries, & Hobolt, 2014). 
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However, this constellation does not necessarily 
hold during mediatized EP election campaigns. When 
voter attention is at least partially directed to Europe-
an questions, incumbent parties, in particular, may see 
themselves as being forced to address these issues as 
they accrue from their governmental responsibility and 
their participation in Brussels’ decision-making. In addi-
tion, mainstream parties that hold or expect to hold 
governmental responsibility might consider that ‘tying 
their hands’ in front of national publics creates bargain-
ing advantages at the supranational level (Bailer & 
Schneider, 2006). In other words, mainstream and par-
ticularly incumbent parties face electoral incentives to 
justify and defend their past and future actions in Brus-
sels (cf. Braun, Hutter, & Kerscher, 2015; Rauh, 2015; 
Senninger & Wagner, 2015). 
From a mediatization perspective, moreover, not all 
political parties have equal chances to place their pre-
ferred issues on the media agenda (Brandenburg, 
2002; Hopmann, Elmelund-Praestekaer, Albaek, 
Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2012; Tresch, 2009). Since 
Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) original argument on the 
positive effect of an actor’s political standing on the 
news value of corresponding events, it has repeatedly 
been shown that both party size and political power af-
fect the degree of partisan media coverage (e.g. Green-
Pedersen, Mortensen, & Thesen, 2015; Hopmann, de 
Vreese, & Albaek, 2011; Tresch, 2009). In particular, 
whether a party is in government or not substantially af-
fects its presence in the news (Brandenburg, 2005; 
Green-Pedersen et al., 2015; Hopmann et al., 2011; 
Schoenbach, De Ridder, & Lauf, 2001). We expect this to 
also hold for the EP election campaigns (see also Jalali 
& Silva, 2011). Again, strategic partisan incentives and 
media logic arguments arrive at similar expectations: 
H1.2: During EP election campaigns, mainstream 
parties’ mobilization efforts on European issues are 
more visible than those of smaller radical parties. 
H1.3: During EP election campaigns, governing 
parties’ mobilization efforts on European issues are 
more visible than those of opposition parties. 
But also with regard to selective partisan emphasis, the 
politicization argument developed above predicts sub-
stantial differences between the 2009 and 2014 EP 
elections. The Eurocrisis and the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ 
initiative present specific issue ownership advantages 
for both radical right and radical left parties, which like-
ly motivates these parties to place ‘their’ European is-
sues on the media agenda. First, redistributing large 
amounts of national funds to other EU member-states 
and the indirect election of the Commission president 
signal strong steps towards further political integration. 
This is likely to foster Eurosceptic mobilization by the 
radical right on the basis of their traditional sovereign-
ty-related arguments ‘against Europe’. Second, the su-
pranational emergency responses to the Euro crisis 
strongly emphasised austerity politics. This should 
serve the mobilization of EU-related socio-economic 
questions along the traditional arguments of the radi-
cal left (de Vries & Edwards, 2009). To the extent that 
the Eurosceptic fringes exploit this mobilization poten-
tial, they confront their mainstream contenders. Such 
conflict, in turn, increases the news value from the per-
spective of media gatekeepers. We thus expect that: 
H1.4: Mobilization efforts on European issues by 
radical right and radical left parties are more visible 
in the EP Elections in 2014 than in the 2009 
campaign. 
Yet, a sole concentration on selective partisan empha-
sis seems too static. Election campaigns should also be 
regarded as dynamic processes (Brandenburg, 2002, p. 
40). The literature on partisan competition argues that 
mainstream parties do not only devise their strategies 
in the face of changing public opinion, but also react to 
other parties’ behaviour (Adams, 2012). Challenger 
parties, which open new dimensions of political com-
petition, can provoke mainstream reactions—both in 
terms of positional changes as well as issue emphasis 
adaptations (Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & 
Sitter, 2010; Hobolt & de Vries, 2015; Meguid, 2005; 
Van Spanje, 2010).1 
Recent work on the topic shows that the success of 
Eurosceptic radical parties, both from the radical left 
and radical far right, is capable of influencing main-
stream parties to tone down their overall support for 
European integration (Meijers, 2015). Moreover, Van 
de Wardt (2015) shows, for the case of Denmark, that 
parliamentary activities of challenger parties on Euro-
pean integration provoke salience shifts by mainstream 
parties. Thus, given the higher salience and higher po-
larization of European issues among the wider elec-
torate, mainstream parties should have an incentive to 
react to publically visible mobilization efforts from their 
Eurosceptic challengers. 
But the literature on party emphasis of EU issues 
has so far mainly focused on highly aggregated cross-
national comparisons or extended time frames (De 
Wilde, 2010; Höglinger, 2012; Hutter & Grande, 2014). 
We assert that our understanding of Eurosceptic con-
tagion is improved by also analysing the micro-level 
dynamics within mediatized election campaigns. This is 
of particular relevance here because the news media 
are prone to cover dynamic, conflictual relationships 
                                                          
1 It is also possible that challenger parties react to mainstream 
party behaviour (see Van de Wardt, 2015). Yet, since main-
stream parties are the ones that hold office and, ultimately, con-
trol the decision-making process the literature has focused on 
the impact of fringe parties on the established political forces. 
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(Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Analogous to the aggregate 
findings on responsive partisan behaviour, we also ex-
pect contagion effects to be visible in the news media: 
H2.1: The more mobilization efforts on European 
issues from radical left and the radical right parties 
are visible at time t-1, the more mainstream party 
emphasis of European issues is visible at time t. 
Such contagion is, however, unlikely to be constant 
across Eurosceptic parties. The different camps oppose 
European integration on fundamentally different 
grounds. The radical right rejects the EU on the basis of 
identity and sovereignty concerns, while the radical left 
rejects the EU on the basis of its ingrained market-
liberal policies (de Vries & Edwards, 2009). In line with 
arguments that party competition over cultural issues 
is becoming more salient (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; 
Kriesi, 2007), Meijers (2015) has shown that the ‘con-
tagion effect’ of Eurosceptic success was stronger for 
the radical right than for the radical left. The radical 
right’s cultural arguments against Europe do not only 
influence the centre-right, but can also provoke ac-
commodative reactions from the centre-left parties (cf. 
Van Spanje, 2010). The reason is that the traditional 
supporters of the centre-left—the working-class—are 
likely to adhere to more culturally conservative stances 
as well (Bale et al., 2010). Radical left critiques of a 
‘neoliberal’ bias in the integration process, in contrast, 
may be co-opted by the centre-left (Statham & Trenz, 
2013, p. 139) but are unlikely to strike a chord among 
the centre-right. Hence, mobilization of European is-
sues from the radical right should be more contagious 
for mainstream parties than similar efforts from the 
radical left. 
Also from a media perspective it is to be expected 
that mediatized radical right mobilization is more ca-
pable of affecting the level of visible mainstream party 
EU issue emphasis. In particular the Dutch and the 
French radical right parties are ‘media savvy’ because 
they rely on a strongly personalized leadership and a 
highly confrontational political style (Mazzoleni, 2007; 
see also de Lange & Art, 2011). The radical left, on the 
other hand, is more fragmented and generally charac-
terized by less conspicuous leadership—at least in the 
French and Dutch cases. Hence, we expect that: 
H2.2: The effect of visible radical right mobilization 
on European issues at time t-1 on mediatized 
mainstream party mobilization on EU issues at time 
t is greater than the effects of visible radical left EU 
mobilization. 
The extant literature has furthermore emphasized that 
contagion effects depend on both the electoral support 
of radical parties and their anticipation of electoral ad-
vantages by raising the salience of European issues 
(Meijers, 2015). Following the above arguments on the 
increasing public politicization of European integration 
between 2009 and 2014, we argue that both the elec-
toral strength of challenger parties and their possible 
gains from raising European issues further should have 
grown during the Eurocrisis and the ‘Spitzenkandiaten’ 
initiative. Indeed, polls at the beginning of the cam-
paigns show that Eurosceptic challengers could have 
expected large gains in the 2014 elections.2 From a 
media perspective, more electoral support increases 
the political standing and the audience relevance of 
these challenger parties. Thus, we finally expect that: 
H2.3: The contagion effect of visible radical left and 
radical right EU mobilization on mainstream parties 
is greater in the 2014 than in the 2009 campaign. 
4. Data and Methods 
The theoretical discussion guides the case selection to 
EU member states with sizeable electoral support for 
Eurosceptic radical parties on both extremes of the po-
litical spectrum. We therefore focus on France and the 
Netherlands. Both countries are founding members of 
the European Communities and share a comparable 
history of being subject to supranational authority. In 
both countries, Eurosceptics from both sides have been 
relatively successful in recent years. Moreover, Euro-
sceptic mobilization in both countries has repeatedly 
affected the progress of European integration, most 
notably with the popular rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005. This makes France and the Netherlands 
apt cases to study the public supply of partisan mobili-
zation on Europe. 
We cover the main Eurosceptic parties as well as 
the principal centre-left and centre-right mainstream 
parties in these countries (see Table 1). Since the 
French radical left is traditionally very fragmented, four 
political parties are included in this group. Since our 
hypotheses compare publically visible mobilization ef-
forts of mainstream parties, which regularly alternate 
in government, with radical Eurosceptic mobilization 
attempts, a number of smaller parties, such as MoDem 
in France and the D66 in the Netherlands, have not 
been included. Although these parties have enjoyed 
noteworthy successes in EP elections, they represent 
minor domestic political forces and cannot be easily di-
chotomized into the mainstream-challenger distinction.
                                                          
2 For Dutch election polls from April 2014, see http://www.tns-
nipo.com/nieuws/persberichten/d66-leidt-landelijk,-pvv-in-
europa (accessed September 23, 2015). For French election 
polls from May 2014 see http://tnova.fr/sondages/exclusif-
sondage-ipsos-steria-pour-le-monde-le-cevipof-et-terra-nova-
elections-europeennes-2014-barometre-quotidien-d-
intentions-de-vote-18-mai (accessed September 24, 2015).  
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Table 1. List of parties included in the analysis.  
 Mainstream parties  Radical parties 
 Centre-left  Centre-right  Radical Left  Radical Right 
France PS (+)  UMP (#)  PdG; PCF; LO; LCR/NPA  Front National 
The Netherlands PvdA (# +)  CDA (#); VVD (+)  SP  PVV 
Note: parties marked with (#) and (+) were incumbents in 2009 and 2014, respectively. 
Our analyses rely on an original dataset that captures 
the co-occurrences of these political parties and Euro-
pean integration issues during the 2009 and 2014 Eu-
ropean Parliament election campaigns in the French 
and Dutch written news media. The newspaper selec-
tion follows Koopmans and Statham (2010, p. 51). It 
covers Le Monde and De Volkskrant as the major left-
leaning and Le Figaro and Algemeen Dagblad as the 
major right-leaning newspapers in France and the 
Netherlands respectively. Since neither country has a 
typical tabloid paper, we take L’Humanité and De 
Telegraaf as the most similar substitutes (Koopmans & 
Statham, 2010). 
Through this diverse newspaper sample we at least 
implicitly control media selection effects due to varying 
outlet audiences. But we have to note that the Dutch 
and French media systems differ (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004). The decreasing state influence on the media in 
the Netherlands is contrasted by the bi-partisan divide 
in the French print media and the strong ties the media 
has with the French government. We thus expect that 
political reporting in general and particularly the pre-
dominance of mainstream and incumbent parties is 
more pronounced in the French case (cf. H1.2 and 
H1.3). Note, however, that our hypotheses do not pre-
dict cross-national differences but solely address dif-
ferences across parties and election campaigns within 
countries. 
The analyses rely on the daily issues of these news-
papers during the hot phase of each campaign in the 
seven weeks before each election day. We identified 
relevant articles in the LexisNexis database by specific 
search strings requiring that an article (in headline or 
body) contain at least one keyword relating to the par-
tisan actors in question and at least one keyword indi-
cating an issue about European integration (see Ap-
pendices A1 and A2 for the full lists). These keywords 
were identified with reference to the codebooks from 
previous studies (Hutter & Grande, 2014; Koopmans, 
2002; Rauh, 2015) and include inflections commonly 
used in the French and Dutch languages. In total, we 
examine 6,174 newspaper articles from six major 
newspapers in four seven-week periods preceding the 
elections. 
Automated scripts store these raw text data in data 
frames with one time stamped observation per article. 
From each observation, we then automatically re-
trieved all sentences that contained at least one Euro-
pean integration keyword and then assessed whether a 
specific party group was also mentioned in this re-
duced textual data. For each article we thus capture 
whether a centre-left, centre-right, radical left or radi-
cal right actor occurred at least once within a grammat-
ical sentence that also contains a keyword on European 
integration. 
We take such co-occurrences as a proxy for publi-
cally visible incidences of partisan efforts to mobilize 
on European integration. It seems plausible that if a 
party takes a newsworthy stance on a European issue 
on a given day, this will be reflect at least once in a 
journalistic sentence that includes both the party and 
the EU marker. A cursory overview of our actual hits in 
the newspaper corpus confirms that this is by and large 
true. The overview indicates a few false positives 
where journalists ascribe some link between a party 
and an EU issue without actual partisan action. The 
counts thus slightly overestimate partisan mobilization, 
which, however, should affect all party groups alike. 
This is further bolstered by systematically comparing 
our data with hand-coded data collection efforts of the 
first author in an earlier project on the 2014 elections. 
We find positive and significant correlations between 
our automatically retrieved counts and these manually 
identified data across party groups and countries.3 In 
sum, our measure adequately corresponds to partisan 
mobilization efforts on European issues. 
This data was finally aggregated to the daily level. 
Accordingly, the unit of analysis is the number of arti-
cles per party and day in which at least one incidence 
of party mobilization on Europe is observed. This al-
lows comparisons across party groups and election pe-
riods needed for hypotheses 1.1–1.4. For the contagion 
effects hypothesised in H2.1–2.3, the dependent varia-
ble is operationalized as the total number of articles 
per day in which mainstream party actors appear in the 
immediate context of European integration. The inde-
pendent variables are an incumbency dummy as well 
as the number of co-occurrences of radical left or radi-
cal right actors and EU issues, lagged by one day. 
Our estimations thus deal with discrete, non-
negative values. The data, in addition, is highly over-
dispersed meaning that the variance of the count vari-
ables exceeds their mean (see Appendix A4). This is 
common for event counts where many observations 
have a value of zero, but it violates the assumption of 
                                                          
3 The manually and automatically retrieved counts of partisan 
mobilization efforts correlate on average with .4 (396 par-
ty/day observations). For more detailed comparisons across 
countries and party groups see Appendix A3. 
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statistical independence in the observed events and 
can inflate coefficient significance. To study contagion 
effects, we thus employ negative binomial regression 
models which include a parameter that reflects the un-
observed heterogeneity in the observations (Long & 
Freese, 2001, p. 243). The data is structured as a panel, 
with ‘days’ being the time variable and ‘party’ the 
cross-sectional identifier.4 To address serial correlation 
issues, a lagged dependent variable has been included 
in each model. In order to be able to control incum-
bency effects explicitly, we estimate random effects 
models and check robustness of our findings also for a 
partisan fixed effects model (Appendix A5).  
                                                          
4 Since the data is made up of consecutive days, the panels are 
strongly balanced. For the Netherlands the number of daily ob-
servations is slightly lower since none of the analysed newspa-
pers are published on Sundays. 
5. Empirical Results 
Figure 1 plots the mean daily count of publically visible 
partisan mobilization on European issues with boot-
strapped 95 per cent confidence intervals. In view of 
the increased public politicization during the Euro crisis 
and the new procedure of binding the Commission 
president to EP election results, we had initially ex-
pected that the average aggregate levels of partisan 
mobilization on European issues would be higher in 
2014 than in 2009. The daily counts of mediatized mo-
bilization on European issues across all parties in Figure 
1 have slightly heightened from 1.65 to 1.8 in France 
and from 0.45 to 0.52 in the Netherlands. But since 
these differences are negligible and far from reaching 
statistical significance, Hypothesis 1.1 is not supported 
in our data. 
 
Figure 1. Average daily co-occurrences of party groups and European issues. Note: the scales for the Netherlands and 
France differ for presentation purposes. 
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How does this picture differ across party groups? In 
contrast to the traditional expectation that mainly 
fringe parties mobilize on European issues (de Vries, 
2007; Statham & Trenz, 2013; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 
2004), our hypotheses 1.2 and 1.3 predicted that main-
stream and particularly incumbent parties have greater 
incentives as well as greater chances to mobilize Euro-
pean issues in the public media (e.g. Hopmann et al., 
2011). This expectation is fully confirmed for France in 
the upper panel of Figure 1—in the media coverage of 
both election campaigns, the centre-left and the cen-
tre-right are associated with European issues much 
more frequently than their radical counterparts. This 
data also underlines the hypothesized incumbent ef-
fect. Mobilization efforts by the UMP, the centre-right 
governing party during Sarkozy’s presidency, were par-
ticularly visible in the 2009 campaign. In 2014, the roles 
reversed and the daily EU mobilization efforts by the 
then governing centre-left PS became predominant. 
Hence, the higher visibility of the centre-left in France 
is an incumbency effect. The French case thus confirms 
our expectations that mainstream and especially in-
cumbent parties publically mobilize on Europe. 
In the Netherlands (lower panel of Figure 1), the 
mean level of centre-right and centre-left mobilization 
efforts on European issues also clearly exceeds the ob-
served levels for the radical challenger parties in 2009. 
However, compared to the French case, the overall pic-
ture is less clear-cut. First, conclusions about the in-
cumbency effect are hampered by the fact that the 
centre-right category comprises both the Christian 
democrats (CDA) and the conservative liberals (VVD), 
which were in government only in 2009 or 2014, re-
spectively. We thus treat these parties separately in 
the regression analyses below. Second, in 2014 the 
mean daily EU mobilization efforts by the radical right 
party (PVV) exceed the levels of mainstream mobiliza-
tion efforts, though this difference is not statistically 
significant.5 
The observed surge of the public EU mobilization 
efforts by the PVV in 2014 points to the expectation 
that the increased politicization of European integra-
tion between the 2009 and 2014 elections created fa-
vourable opportunity structures to mobilize European 
issues for the radical Eurosceptic parties (H1.4). But the 
radical left mobilization of European issues did not sig-
nificantly change across the two election campaigns. 
                                                          
5 The fact that our findings on these hypotheses diverge across 
both countries is consistent with literature showing that une-
ven power distributions among political parties in national sys-
tems is mirrored in differing mobilization potentials (e.g. 
Schoenbach et al., 2001). In the highly uneven, presidential sys-
tem in France, incumbent parties enjoy distinct advantages in 
terms of mobilization potentials. On the contrary, the Dutch 
proportional representation system, where political power is 
more equally distributed, seems to produce more equitable 
arenas for public mobilization efforts. 
This echoes claims that the Euro crisis did not offer op-
portunities for fundamentally re-thinking the structure 
of the European economy (Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). 
Moreover, the finding that the radical left was not able 
to mobilize significantly more resonates well with the 
view that cultural aspects of European integration have 
become more pervasive than socio-economic conflicts 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Meijers, 2015).  
And indeed, the data demonstrate that visible radi-
cal right EU mobilization in the 2014 campaign is higher 
than in 2009 and that this difference is statistically sig-
nificant. In the media coverage of the 2009 French 
election campaign, the radical right was associated 
with European issues on average only 0.16 times a day. 
In 2014, this surged to a daily average of 0.96 publically 
visible mobilization efforts from the radical right. Ex-
pressed differently, while the media coverage of the 
French 2009 campaign supplied radical right stances on 
Europe only on roughly every sixth day, such signals in-
creased to an almost daily frequency in 2014. Similarly, 
in the Netherlands the higher degree of average daily 
radical right mobilization efforts on Europe is also size-
able and statistically significant (from 0.25 daily counts 
in 2009 to 0.7 in 2014). As shown, this extended visibil-
ity of the Dutch radical right’s mobilization efforts on 
Europe even surpasses the levels of their major nation-
al mainstream competitors in the most recent EP elec-
tion campaign. In line with hypothesis 1.4, thus, this 
suggests that both Le Pen’s Front National and Wilders’ 
PVV used the politicized context of 2014 elections 
much more strongly to publically communicate their 
stances on actual European questions. But has this in-
creased Euroscepticism from the radical right also be-
come more contagious for other actors in the debate? 
To tackle this question, we now focus on our hy-
potheses addressing the micro-level dynamics within 
electoral campaigns. The results of the negative bino-
mial regression analyses are reported in Table 2. Ra-
ther than the originally estimated logarithm of the ex-
pected event count, we report exponentiated 
coefficients in this table. These figures express the 
more straightforward incidence rate ratios. That is, 
they show how one unit increase in the independent 
variables (radical left and radical right mobilization at t-
1 as well as incumbency) affects the rate by which the 
event of interest—publically visible mainstream mobili-
zation efforts on European issues—occurs. Hence, val-
ues below 1 signal a negative relationship and values 
above 1 a positive relationship. This standardization al-
lows us to compare effect sizes across models.6 
                                                          
6 Since the standard errors of the exponentiated coefficients 
are not meaningful, the standard errors of the regular negative 
binomial regressions coefficients are reported. This does not 
affect the significance of the results, since the associated t-
values are identical. 
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Table 2. Negative binomial panel regression results. 
 Daily co-occurrences of Mainstream parties and EU issues 
 France  The Netherlands 
 2009 2014  2009 2014 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Lagged DV (t-1) 1.024 
(0.0288) 
1.053+ 
(0.0286) 
 0.835 
(0.194) 
1.096 
(0.100) 
EU Statements Rad. Left (t-1) 1.163 
(0.100) 
1.140* 
(0.0598) 
 0.630 
(0.384) 
1.167 
(0.289) 
EU Statements Rad. Right (t-1) 2.256** 
(0.223) 
1.159* 
(0.0672) 
 2.215* 
(0.325) 
1.381* 
(0.127) 
Incumbent 3.083** 
(0.212) 
1.792** 
(0.188) 
 0.743 
(0.301) 
2.023* 
(0.339) 
Constant 1.139 
(0.349) 
1.030 
(0.313) 
 0.775 
(0.447) 
0.599 
(0.589) 
No. observations 98 98  126 126 
No. of Days 49 49  42 42 
Wald Chi2 60.11** 46.70**  8.01+ 15.48** 
Log likelihood -195.95 -199.26  -128.21 -124.67 
Note: exponentiated coefficients (Incidence rate ratios); Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
The results for France in the left panel of Table 2 show 
that the overall rather limited mobilization efforts on 
EU issues from the radical left also triggered only lim-
ited responses from the mainstream parties. In 2009 
the effect fails to reach statistical significance, in 2014 
radical left statements at t-1 raise the propensity of 
mainstream party EU mobilization by 14 per cent at 
t=0. The contagion effects of the French radical right, in 
contrast, are more sizeable and statistically robust. In 
2009, Front National statements on European issues 
made mainstream party EU statements almost 2.3 
times more likely on the subsequent day. Robust con-
tagion effects from the radical right can also be shown 
for the 2014 election in France, but their absolute size 
declined to, approximately, 16 percentage points. 
In the Dutch campaigns, we find no significant con-
tagion effects from the radical left. But like the French 
cases, the Dutch radical right was also able to spur 
mainstream party reactions by its EU mobilization 
while the size of this contagion effect declined as well. 
In 2009, mediatized radical right mobilization efforts on 
EU issues at t-1 substantially affect co-occurrence of 
mainstream parties and EU issues on the following day, 
increasing the expected number of corresponding 
counts by more than 120 percentage points. In 2014, 
this contagion effect of radical right mobilization on 
European issues is still significant but amounts to only 
38 percentage points.7 
Besides the fact that our respective control variable 
largely confirms expectation that particularly parties in 
                                                          
7 We have additionally estimated reversed models in order to 
detect whether there is a reciprocal relationship between 
mainstream and challenger moiblization efforts. These are re-
ported in Table A6.1 in the appendix. Only for the Netherlands 
in 2014 was such a reciprocal effect found. 
government are associated with EU issues in the media 
(H1.3), the models contradict claims that radical parties 
have no leverage over the extent to which mainstream 
parties address European issues (Green-Pedersen, 
2012; Hutter & Grande, 2014). In line with our hypoth-
eses 2.1 and 2.2 we demonstrate cross-temporal con-
tagion effects, and as expected in extant research they 
are much more pronounced for the radical right than 
for the radical left (Bale et al., 2010; Meijers, 2015; Van 
Spanje, 2010). Much to our surprise, however, the 
higher public salience of EU issues during the period of 
the seventh European Parliament has not strengthened 
these contagion effects as suggested by H2.3. While 
radical right contagion remained significant, its abso-
lute size declined if we compare the 2014 EP election 
campaign to the 2009 campaign. Thus an increased so-
cietal EU politicization does not automatically translate 
into a more interactive partisan debate about EU issues 
(Rauh & Zürn, 2014). 
6. Conclusions 
At first sight, our systematic comparisons of mediatized 
partisan mobilization efforts on European issues during 
the French and Dutch EP election campaigns in 2009 
and 2014 result in a complex picture. Most important-
ly, the overall publically visible partisan debate on Eu-
ropean issues was not significantly higher in the 2014 
campaign. Distinguishing different party groups, we 
observe a rather stable dominance of mainstream and 
particularly incumbent parties. The major change from 
the 2009 to the 2014 EP elections in both countries, 
however, is a clearly heightened visibility of radical 
right mobilization efforts on European issues. Yet, this 
has not increased the responsiveness of mainstream 
parties as the analysis of cross-temporal contagion ef-
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fects underlines. To be sure, we demonstrate signifi-
cant short-term contagion from the fringes of the party 
spectrum to the mainstream parties across both coun-
tries and elections, but the size of these contagion ef-
fects has manifestly declined from the 2009 to the 
2014 EP election campaigns. 
This article has provided innovative and robust find-
ings with regard to the inter-party dynamics and pat-
terns of parties’ mobilization efforts during mediatized 
EP election campaigns. It is unclear, however, to what 
extent these patterns of visible mobilization are medi-
ated by the type of EU issue. Future research should 
take this into account when examining the inter-party 
dynamics in EP campaigns. Moreover, the data pre-
sented draws on aggregated visibility levels from quali-
ty and non-broadsheet newspapers and has not fo-
cused on the tone of the news articles in question. 
Hence, the extent to which outlet type and the charac-
teristics of the news coverage affect patterns of visible 
party competition should be further explored. Moreo-
ver, future research efforts should ascertain whether 
the patterns found for France and the Netherlands are 
generalizable to other EU member states. 
Nevertheless, with respect to electoral accountability 
in EP elections, our analysis of the supply side of political 
debate on Europe in member-states with high support 
for Eurosceptics should be enough to stir normative 
concern. While European questions have become much 
more salient for the wider citizenry between the 2009 
and 2014 EP election campaigns (Rauh & Zürn, 2014), 
our data show that the partisan supply of political alter-
natives or justifications on European issues has not fol-
lowed suit. Despite the profound socio-economic reper-
cussions of the Eurocrisis and despite the attempt to 
increase the consequentiality of the vote choice by in-
stalling lead candidates, neither the radical left nor most 
mainstream parties seemed willing or able to step up 
their mobilization game on European issues in the 2014 
electoral contests. The fact that the French centre-left 
did emphasize EU issues more is best explained by the 
incumbency effect rather than heightened purposive EU 
issue emphasis. As such, the mobilization potential has 
apparently been left to radical right parties that oppose 
supranationalization on cultural grounds.  
Thus, increased radical right mobilization in con-
junction with the declining contagion effects on main-
stream parties suggests that the 2014 EP elections in 
France and the Netherlands did not result in a broader 
publically visible and more interactive debate about 
European issues. In this light, the most recent election 
campaigns for the European Parliament hardly provid-
ed an effective antidote to citizen alienation from 
common political decision-making in Europe. 
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Appendix A1. Party identification dictionary. 
Table A1.1. French keywords (names and individuals) for party identification. 
Group Party names Key individuals Type of individual 
Centre Left 
Parti socialiste Cambadélis Leader (2014 only) 
PS Désir Leader (2014 only) 
 
Aubry Leader (2009 only) 
 
Ayrault Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Bricq Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Duflot Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Fabius Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Filippeti Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Fioraso Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Fourneyron Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Hollande Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Le Drian Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Le Foll Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Lebranchu Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Lurel Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Martin Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Montebourg Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Moscovici Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Pinel Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Sapin Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Taubira Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Touraine Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Vallaud-Belkacem Incumbent (2014 only) 
 Valls Incumbent (2014 only) 
Centre 
Right 
UMP Sarkozy Leader / Incumbent 
Union pour un mouvement populaire Copé Leader (2014 only) 
 
Bertrand Leader (2009 only) 
 
Albanel Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Alliot-Marie Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Barnier Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Borloo Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Boutin Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Darcos Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Fillon Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Kouchner Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Lagarde Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Morin Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Pécresse Incumbent (2009 only) 
 Woerth Incumbent (2009 only) 
Radical 
Left 
FdG Laurent Leader (2014 only) 
FG Buffet Leader (2009 only) 
Front de Gauche Arthaud Leader 
Front de gauche pour changer d'Europe Besancenot Leader 
Gauche Unitaire Laguiller Leader 
GU Mélenchon Leader 
LCR Picquet Leader 
Ligue communiste révolutionnaire Poupin Leader 
LO 
  Lutte (O|o)uvrière  
  Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste 
  NPA 
  Parti communiste français 
  Parti de Gauche 
  PCF 
  PdG 
  PG   
Radical 
Right 
FN Le Pen Leader 
Front National 
  FRONT NATIONAL   
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Table A1.2. Dutch keywords (names and individuals) for party identification. 
Group Party names Key individuals Type of individual 
Center Left 
Partij van de Arbeid Samsom Leader (2014 only) 
PvdA Spekman Leader (2014 only) 
 
Bos Leader (2009 only) 
 
Asscher Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Bussemaker Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Dijsselbloem Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Plasterk Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Ploumen Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Timmermans Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Cramer Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Koenders Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Plasterk Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
ter Horst Incumbent (2009 only) 
 van der Laan Incumbent (2009 only) 
Center Right 
Christen-Democratisch Appèl Bruma Leader (2014 only) 
CDA Balkenende Leader (2009 only) 
 
Verhagen Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Hirsch Ballin Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Eurlings Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
van der Hoeven Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Verburg Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Donner Incumbent (2009 only) 
 
Klink Incumbent (2009 only) 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie Rutte Leader 
VVD Kamp  Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Hennis-Plasschaert Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Schippers Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Schultz van Haegen Incumbent (2014 only) 
 
Blok Incumbent (2014 only) 
 Opstelten Incumbent (2014 only) 
Radical Left 
Socialistische Partij Marijnissen Leader (2009 only) 
SP Roemer Leader (2014 only) 
Radical Right 
Partij voor de Vrijheid Wilders Leader 
PVV     
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Appendix A2. European integration dictionaries. 
Table A2.1. French keywords marking European integration issues. 
les européennes Banque centrale européenne ([[:alpha:]])*avis 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
mesur([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
électio([[:alpha:]])* au parlement 
européen 
BCE affaire([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
monnaie commune 
électio([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
budget de l'Union européenne agenda européen norme([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
scruti([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
CJCE avis de l'ue orientatio([[:alpha:]])* de l'UE 
 CJUE budget de l'UE orientatio([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
commissaire de l'UE Commission européenne compétenc([[:alpha:]])* de l'UE Pacte de stabilité et de croissance 
Commissaire 
européen([[:alpha:]]){0,1} 
Conseil européen compétenc([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
politique de l'UE 
conseil des ministres européen Cour de justice de l'Union 
européenne 
crise de la dette politique de l'Union européenne 
déput([[:alpha:]])* au Parlement 
européen 
Cour de justice des Communautés 
européennes 
crise de l'euro politique étrangère et de sécurité 
commune 
députe au Parlement européen cour de justice européenne décisio([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue politique étrangère et de sécurité 
européenne 
députe europée([[:alpha:]])* Cour des comptes européenne décisio([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
politique européenne 
eurodépute eta([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue Directiv([[:alpha:]])* de l'UE procedur([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
MPE etat([[:alpha:]])* 
membre([[:alpha:]])* de l'UE 
Directive de l'Union européenne programme européen 
Parlement européen etat([[:alpha:]])* 
membre([[:alpha:]])* de l'Union 
européenne 
droit de l'ue recommandatio([[:alpha:]])* de 
l'ue 
président de la Commission eurogroupe droit de l'union européenne recommandatio([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
président de la Banque centrale 
européenne 
executi([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
droit européen règle([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
Président du Conseil européen FEDER engagement([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
règlemen([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue 
 fonctionnair([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue fonds ([[:alpha:]])*( 
)*europé([[:alpha:]])* 
règlemen([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
coopération européenne Fonds européen de 
développement régional 
juridique de l'UE Schengen 
intégration européenne Fonds social européen juridique europée([[:alpha:]])* stratégi([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
projet européen FSE l’euro stratégie de l'UE 
 Haut-Représentan([[:alpha:]])* législat([[:alpha:]])* de l'UE subside([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue 
traité d'Amsterdam institutio([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue législat([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
subside([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
constitution européenne institutio([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
lo([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue subvention([[:alpha:]])* de l'ue 
fonctionnair([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
organ([[:alpha:]])* de l'UE lo([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
subvention([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
TCE organ([[:alpha:]])* 
européen([[:alpha:]])* 
Mandat europé([[:alpha:]])*  
TECE Parlement européen   
trait([[:alpha:]])* de l'UE pays de l'ue marché intérieur de l'UE  
trait([[:alpha:]])* de l'Union 
européenne 
sommet européen marché intérieur de l'Union 
européene 
 
trait([[:alpha:]])* 
europée([[:alpha:]])* 
UEM marché intérieur européen  
traité de Lisbonne Union économique et monétaire marché unique européen  
traité de Lisbonne Union européenne marché unique de l'UE  
traité de Maastricht union monétaire marché unique de l'Union 
européene 
 
traité de Nice zone euro   
traite de Rome de 2004    
traite de Rome II    
traite établissant une constitution 
pour l'Europe 
   
traité sur l'UE    
traité sur l'Union européenne       
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Table A2.2. Dutch keywords marking European integration issues. 
(E|e)uropese verkiezingen 
(E|e)uropese 
lidsta([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-richtlijn([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese 
aanbeveling([[:alpha:]])* 
verkiezingen voor het 
(E|e)uropees Parlement (EU|eu)-lidsta([[:alpha:]])* (E|e)uropese regel([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-advie([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese 
Parlementsverkiezingen (E|e)uropese Unie 
(E|e)uropese 
richtlijn([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)urope([[:alpha:]])* 
advie([[:alpha:]])* 
 
(E|e)uropese Commissie  (EU|eu)-begroting 
(E|e)uropese 
beleidslijn([[:alpha:]])* 
(ecb|ECB)-directie (E|e)uropees Parlement (E|e)uropese begroting (EU|eu)-beleidslijn([[:alpha:]])* 
commissievoorzitter (E|e)uropese Raad Schengen 
(E|e)uropese 
competentie([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese ministerraad 
Hof van Justitie van de 
(E|e)uropese Unie de (E|e)uro 
(EU|eu)-
competentie([[:alpha:]])* 
Raad van Ministers (E|e)uropees Hof van Justitie (E|e)uropese grondwet (E|e)uropese rechtsorde 
voorzitter van de (E|e)uropese 
Centrale Bank (E|e)uropese Rekenkamer (E|e)urocrisis (EU|eu)-rechtsorde 
 
ECB schuldencrisis 
(E|e)uropese 
strategi([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese commissaris (E|e)uropese Centrale Bank 
(E|e)uropese 
instelling([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-strategi([[:alpha:]])* 
Eurocommissaris 
(E|e)uropees Fonds voor 
Regionale Ontwikkeling  (EU|eu)-instelling([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-verdrag([[:alpha:]])* 
EU commissaris EFRO (EU|eu)-organen (E|e)uropese politiek 
(EU|eu)-parlementariër  (E|e)uropees Sociaal Fonds  (E|e)uropees orgaan (EU|eu)-politiek 
Europarlementariër  ESF  
(E|e)uropese 
maatregel([[:alpha:]])* (E|e)uropese binnenmarkt 
(E|e)uropese raadsvoorzitter Euro zone (EU|eu)-maatregel([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)urope([[:alpha:]])* 
programm([[:alpha:]])* 
Voorzitter van de (E|e)uropese 
Raad Eurozone 
(E|e)urope([[:alpha:]])* 
Manda([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-subsidi([[:alpha:]])* 
 
stabiliteits- en groeipact EU manda([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese 
subsidi([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)urope([[:alpha:]])* 
verdrag([[:alpha:]])* 
EU ([[:alpha:]])*( 
)*fonds([[:alpha:]])* (E|e)uropese top 
gemeenschappelijk buitenlands 
en veiligheidsbeleid 
Verdrag van Maastricht 
(E|e)urope([[:alpha:]])* 
fond([[:alpha:]])* EU top 
(E|e)uropees buitenlands en 
veiligheidsbeleid 
Verdrag van Amsterdam structuurfond([[:alpha:]])* (E|e)urogroep 
(EU|eu)-
voorschrift([[:alpha:]])* 
Verdrag van Nice monetaire unie (E|e)uropees recht 
Europe([[:alpha:]])* 
Voorschrift([[:alpha:]])* 
Verdrag van Lissabon gemeenschappelijke munt (EU|eu)-recht([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese 
norm([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese 
ambtena([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-orgaan (EU|eu)-wetgeving EU norm([[:alpha:]])* 
 
(E|e)uropese organen (E|e)uropese wetgeving (E|e)uropese betrokkenheid 
(E|e)uropese integratie (EU|eu)-ambtena([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-wet EU betrokkenheid 
(E|e)uropese samenwerking hoge vertegenwoordiger (E|e)uropese wet([[:alpha:]])* 
 (E|e)uropese executieve (E|e)uropese project (EU|eu)-regelgeving 
 
 
(EU|eu)-land([[:alpha:]])* (E|e)uropese regelgeving 
 
 
(EU|eu)-sta([[:alpha:]])* (EU|eu)-regel([[:alpha:]])* 
 
 
(E|e)uropees Hof van Justitie 
(E|e)urope([[:alpha:]])* 
besluit([[:alpha:]])* 
 
 
(EU|eu)-gerechtshof (EU|eu)-besluit([[:alpha:]])* 
 
 
(E|e)uropese 
procedur([[:alpha:]])* 
(E|e)uropese 
beschikking([[:alpha:]])* 
 
 
(E|e)uropese interne markt (EU|eu)-beschikking 
 
 
(E|e)uropese eenheidsmarkt 
(E|e)uropese 
verordening([[:alpha:]])* 
   (E|e)uropese agenda (EU|eu)-verordening   
 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 83-103 100 
Appendix A3. Comparison automated and manual coding. 
To validate our automated measure of mediatized partisan mobilization presented in Section four of the article, this 
appendix compares it to a set of hand-coded data gathered by the first author in an earlier project on the 2014 EP elec-
tions in France and the Netherlands. Here a human coder identified acts of partisan mobilization in newspaper articles 
along the nuclear sentence approach (Kleinnijenhuis, De Ridder, & Rietberg, 1997). This is very close, but not identical 
to the aims of the measure proposed in this article. First, the manually coded data only capture direct, literal party 
statements whereas our data also includes journalistic attributions. Second, the manually coded data rely on slightly 
different newspaper samples excluding L’Humanité for France but including NRC Handelsblad and Het Financieele 
Dagblad for the Netherlands. 
Thus, the human coded data present a more conservative measure of partisan mobilization on the one hand and 
may be subject to different newspaper biases on the other. But if our claim is correct that our automated measure by 
and large captures partisan efforts to mobilize on Europe, they should be systematically related to the event counts re-
trieved by this human data collection. We thus merged both data sets for the overlapping 396 daily observations during 
the 2014 EP election campaign to compare the results. 
Figure A3.1 plots the linear relationships between the automated and the manually coded counts. Specifically, the 
graph shows the relationship between the daily counts of articles containing automatically retrieved co-occurrences of 
political party and EU keywords and the daily count of articles containing manually coded party statements on Europe-
an integration. In fact, our counts are on average somewhat higher as assumed above. But across countries and also 
across party groups they are positively and significantly related to the manually coded information. This does not fully 
hold for the radical left in France which has a limited number of observations in both data sets: the relationship is still 
positive but closely fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Yet, all in all these findings make us even 
more confident that our measures tap into the dynamics we are interested in. 
 
Figure A3.1. Comparing automated and manual coding in the 2014 EP elections. Note: The graph plots the linear corre-
lation between the daily counts of articles containing automatically retrieved co-occurrences of political party and EU 
keywords and the daily count of articles containing manually coded party statements on European integration.
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Appendix A4. Descriptive statistics. 
The descriptive statistics used to calculate Figure 1 in the article, which plots the average daily co-occurrences of party 
groups and European issues, are presented in Table A4.1. To be sure, Figure 1 in the article shows the daily main of co-
occurrences of party groups and European issues, whereas Table A4.1 shows the sum of all co-occurrences of party 
groups and European issues per party for each country/election. 
Table A4.1. Descriptive statistics of party and EU keyword co-occurrences at article level. 
 
France 
 
The Netherlands 
 
2009 
 
2014 
 
2009  2014 
Centre-Right 920 
 
388  150/110  65/170 
Centre-Left 284 
 
732 
 
115  140 
Radical Right 16 
 
192 
 
55  150 
Radical Left 104 
 
128 
 
50  35 
N 1324  1440  480  560 
Note: Table shows the total number of articles with co-occurrences of party keywords with EU keywords in the same 
grammatical sentence. The centre-right category for the Netherlands comprises both centre-right parties and first reports 
CDA results followed by the VVD results (CDA/VVD). 
Table A4.2 shows a tabulation of the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable of the negative binomial panel re-
gression models (see Table 2 in the article). The table shows that we are dealing with highly over-dispersed data—
indicated by the fact that the variance of the count variables is greater than their mean. 
Table A4.2. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable. 
 France 
 
The Netherlands 
 2009 
 
2014 
 
2009 
 
2014 
Mean 3.01 
 
2.8 
 
0.58 
 
0.58 
Variance 9.42 
 
9.09 
 
1.07 
 
1.04 
N 100 
 
100 
 
129 
 
129 
Note: Table shows the mean and the variance for the dependent variable in the negative binomial panel regression mod-
els, i.e. the number of co-occurrences of party and EU keywords per day for the mainstream parties. 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 83-103 102 
Appendix A5. Robustness check. 
The models in the main article are negative binomial regression models calculated with random effects. The decision to 
opt for random effects models rather than fixed effects models was informed by our substantive interest to include an 
incumbent dummy in the models. Since we have a low number of panels in both cases, this would result in perfect and 
near multicollinearity of the models in the French and Dutch cases respectively. To ensure that our models are robust 
to more stringent, fixed effects specification, we have re-calculated the models with party fixed effects, which limit the 
calculated variation to within party variation only. These models are shown in Table A5.1 and do lead to the same sub-
stantial interpretations presented in the main text of the article. 
Table A5.1. Negative binomial panel regression results. 
 Daily co-occurrences of Mainstream parties and EU issues 
 France  The Netherlands 
 2009 2014  2009 2014 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Lagged DV (t-1) 1.031 
(0.0307) 
1.057+ 
(0.0312) 
 0.837 
(0.164) 
1.081 
(0.110) 
EU Statements Rad. Left (t-1) 1.172 
(0.118) 
1.140* 
(0.0682) 
 0.635 
(0.245) 
1.194 
(0.346) 
EU Statements Rad. Right (t-1) 2.303** 
(0.522) 
1.159* 
(0.0788) 
 2.210* 
(0.723) 
1.375* 
(0.178) 
Constant 2.470* 
(0.953) 
1.375 
(0.415) 
 0.585 
(0.232) 
0.944 
(0.489) 
No. observations 98 98  126 126 
No. of Days 49 49  42 42 
Wald Chi2 17.44** 31.93**  7.0+ 9.73+ 
Log likelihood -190.89 -192.87  -119.66 -116.04 
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (Incidence rate ratios); Standard errors in parentheses; Model includes party fixed ef-
fects (not shown); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 83-103 103 
Appendix A6. Reverse models. 
With regard to the interaction between party campaigning, the substantive focus of this article is on the impact of Eu-
rosceptic challenger parties’ visible mobilization efforts on the visibility mainstream party mobilization. Table A6.1 nev-
ertheless shows the estimates of the reverse model: whether visible mainstream party mobilization on EU issues affects 
the extent to which Eurosceptic challenger parties visibly address European issues. Unlike the main models presented in 
Table 2 and Table A5.1, not all reverse models are significant. Only the 2014 models for both countries have significant 
Wald Chi2 estimates—indicating overall model significance. Looking at the French model for the 2014 EP campaign, it 
becomes apparent that visible mainstream party EU mobilization efforts do not affect the degree of visible mobilization 
efforts of the Eurosceptic challenger parties. In the Dutch 2014 EP campaign, we do find significant effects. Both the 
statement by the Dutch centre-left and by the centre-right party VVD affect the extent to which Eurosceptic parties vis-
ibly emphasize EU issues in the written news media. 
Table A6.1. Reverse negative binomial panel regression results. 
 Daily co-occurrences of Eurosceptic challenger parties and EU issues 
 France  The Netherlands 
 2009  2014  2009  2014 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 Coef. IRR  Coef. IRR  Coef. IRR  Coef. IRR 
Lagged DV (t-1) 0.0992 
(0.0716) 
1.104  0.0708 
(0.0502) 
1.073  0.240 
(0.533) 
1.272  -0.0346 
(0.233) 
0.966 
EU Statements Centre Left (t-1) -0.0402 
(0.0615) 
0.961  0.0295 
(0.0389) 
1.030  -0.0463 
(0.513) 
0.955  0.430* 
(0.206) 
1.537 
EU Statements Centre Right (t-1) -0.0348 
(0.0622) 
0.966  0.0224 
(0.0440) 
1.023       
EU Statements  
CDA (t-1) 
      -0.0446 
(0.262) 
0.956  -0.0273 
(0.331) 
0.973 
EU Statements  
VVD (t-1) 
      -0.121 
(0.415) 
0.886  0.182+ 
(0.100) 
1.200 
Constant 0.716* 
(0.324) 
  0.268 
(0.295) 
  14.53 
(1971.9) 
  -0.000390 
(0.935) 
 
No. obs. 98  98  84  84 
No. of Days 49  49  42  42 
Wald Chi2 3.92  23.35**  0.48  9.63* 
Log likelihood -195.85  -195.33  -43.55  -59.85 
Notes: Coefficients and exponentiated coefficients (IRRs) shown; Standard errors in parentheses; Model includes party 
fixed effects (not shown); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
